PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED -BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ACT OF GOD.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, decides in Harrison v. Hughes, 125 Fed. 86o, that the
extinguishment of the stake light, by the wind
What
Constitutes
due to its improper adjustment cannot be attributed to the act of God or vis major, so as to relieve
the contractors from liability, being something which might
reasonably have been anticipated, and could have been
guarded against in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance.

BANKRUPTCY.

The United States District Court (W..D. New York)
holds In re Hawkins, 125 Fed. 633, that a court of bankPrivateSale

ruptcy or a referee has discretionary power to

order a private sale of a bankrupt's property,
with or without notice, and the action of a referee in directing such a sale ought not to be disturbed unless it clearly
appears that his discretion was improvidently exercised.

BANKS.

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Hier v. Miller,
75 Pac. 77, that the cashier of a bank organized under the
laws of that state has no implied authority to
AuthOritY
pay his individual debts by entering the amount
of them as a credit upon the pass book of
his

creditor, who keeps an account with the bank, and permitting the creditor to exhaust such account by checks which
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are paid, the bank having received nothing of value in the
transaction. Consequently if the cashier of a bank, without
actual authority so to do, should undertake to pay his individual debts in the manner stated, the bank may recover
of his creditor the amount of money it may put out upon
checks drawn upon the face of the unauthorized pass-book
entries. See also Wilson v. Railway Co., 12o N. Y. 125.

BENEFICIARY ASSOCIATION.

In Littleton v. Wells, &c., 56 Atl. 798, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decides that the payment of his dues by
Payment of a member of a beneficiary association, at the
Dues
time required by its by-laws, to an officer not
authorized to collect the dues, though he frequently did
receive them from members, is not a compliance with the
association's requirements, where the officer failed to pay
the dues at the proper time to the person authorized to
collect them.
BURGLARY.

One may not be convicted of breaking a warehouse;
though he removes a window strip, where his action does
not without additional effort make entry posBreaking
sible: Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Gaddie
v. Commonwealth, 78 S. W. 162.

BURIAL OF DEAD.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviews the law on
the subject of legal rights in regard to the burial of the dead
Right to
in the case of Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 Atl.
Control
878. Decedent left a widow and one child,
and was buried in a lot belonging- to his father's family.
Decedent's child died a year later, and was buried in a lot
purchased by the widow in another cemetery, the daughter
desiring her father to be buried with her. The lot in which
the father had been buried was not large enough for the
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bodies of his wife and daughter unless they were put in the
same grave with the decedent, and the relations between the
wife and her husband's family were strained. The court
decides that the wife could remove the body of the husband
to the lot purchased by her. See for references in regard
to this matter a note to Johnston v. Marinus, 18 Abb. N. C.
75, and note the recent case of Stewart v. Garrett, 46 S.
E. 427.
CARRIERS.

An invalid passenger injured by the negligence of a railway company is entitled to recover for an increase of her
existing ailments thereby occasioned: Court of
Invalid
Passenger
Appeals at Kansas City, Missouri, in Matthew
v. Wabash R. Co., 78 S. W. 271. But though an invalid
passenger is entitled to receive the same high degree of care
as other passengers, yet, in the absence of notice to the
carriers of her condition, she is not entitled to special care.
In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harrison, 77 S. W.
lO36, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds that a carUnwarmed rier advertising to run an excursion train, withCar
out change of cars, from a point on its own
line over the lines of connecting carriers, is liable for an
injury to a passenger from negligently furnishing an unwarmed car, which occurs while the car is being operated by
the connecting carriers, though the latter are also negligent
in failing to inspect the car on receiving it.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In People of the State of New York v. Night, 24 S. C.
R. 202, the Supreme Court of the United States holds that
a franchise tax imposed under appropriate staCommerce

tutes of the state of New York upon the Penn-

sylvania Railroad Company for carrying on a
cab service wholly within the state for the purpose of conveying its passengers to and from its ferry landing in New
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York City, the charges for which are entirely separate
from those for other transportation, is not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, but is a tax upon
an independent local service, preliminary or subsequent to
any interstate transportation.

In an elaborate decision from which three judges dissent
the Court of Appeals of New York lholdg in People v. LochRegulating ner, 69 N. E. 373, that a statute providing that
no employee shall be required to work in a
Hours of
bakery or confectionery establishment more than
Work
sixty hours in any one week, nor more than ten hours a day,
except for the purpose of making a shorter workday on the
last day of the week, nor more hours in any one week than
will make an average of ten hours per day for the number
of days which the employee shall work, is an exercise of the
police power relating to the public health, and is constitutional both under the state constitution and under the United
States Constitution. It is not necessary to cite cases in relation to this subject. It is sufficient to say that the authorities
are carefully and exhaustively collected in the several opinions rendered. It is worth while, however, to refer to a case
decided by the same court less than three weeks later, where
a regulation as to the wages for a legal day's work to all
classes of laborers on public works is also held constitutional:
Ryan v. City of New York, 69 N. E. 599. Three judges
dissent.

In German Savings & Loan Society v. Dora May Dorrnitzer, 24 S. C. R. 221, the Supreme Court of the United
States holds that a decree of divorce may be imDivorce:
peached collaterally in the courts of another state
Full Faith
by proof that the court granting it had no jurisand Credit
diction because of the plaintiff's want of domicil, even when
the record purports to show such jurisdiction and the appearance of the other party. Mr. Justice McKenna dissents.
See the very recent case of Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S.
14, 39. (See Note, infra, 3 22ff., AMERICAN LAW REGISTER,

vol.

52,

p.

322.)
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CONTRACTS.

The Court of Appeals at St. Louis, Mo., holds in Sisson
v. Supreme Court of Honor, 78 S. W. 297, that where a
Construction benefit certificate issued by a mutual benefit asso-

ciation provides that, if a member lose a hand,
he shall receive a certain sum, the member may
recover such sum if his hand is so injured as to be practically
useless to him, though it is not entirely amputated.
of Benefit
Certificates

CORPORATIONS.

In Stickel v. Atwood, 56 Atl. 687, it is decided by the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island that the president of a
Officers

corporation, who participates in the issuance of

bonds which falsely represent that they are
secured by all the property of the corporation,
is liable in an action for deceit by the purchaser of the bonds,
though the president was ignorant of the sale in question.
It is further held that a recital in a corporate bond that it is
"secured by all the property and assets of the company"
imports that the bonds are secured by some particular lien.
See in connection with this case the interesting case of
Hempfling v. Burr, 59 Mich. 294.
False Representations

The Supreme Court of Montana holds in Porter v. Plymouth Gold Min. Co., 74 Pac. 938, that a private corporation
may purchase its stock if the transaction is fair
Purchase of
Stock
and in good faith, if it is free from fraud, actual
or constructive, if the corporation is not insolvent or in
process of dissolution, and if the rights of its creditors are
in no way affected thereby. It is decided also in line with
this holding that a contract for the sale of stock by a corporation, whereby the corporation agreed to take back the stock
if the purchaser should become dissatisfied therewith, is not
objectionable as a secret contract between a corporation and
a subscriber, by which the subscriber is at liberty to withdraw
his subscription, but is valid and enforceable. See Clapp v.
Peterson, 104 Ill. 26, and i Cook on Corporations,sec. 311.
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The same court decides in Forresterv. Boston, &c., Co.,
74 Pac. io88, that a transfer by the directors of a corporation of all its property to a foreign corporation
Transfer of
Property
organized by the directors of the former for the
purpose of receiving its property, the scheme being to have
its stockholders sell to or exchange their stock with the new
company, is not voidable only but void.

DIVORCE.

It is held by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in
, 56 At. 736, that the statutory remedy
v. GGCruelty:
Constructive

for the wife for extreme cruelty of the husband

is divorce a inensa et thoro and permanent alimony; but, if the cruelty is sufficient to warrant
Desertion
a divorce a mensa, she may separate herself from her husband, and such separation will constitute constructive desertion on his part, and if continued for the statutory period
will entitle her to a divorce a vinculo. It is also decided
that when a wife voluntarily separated herself from her husband on the ground of his cruelty, but received from him
a competent monthly support, there was no such desertion
on his part as entitled her to a divorce a vinculo. Compare
Kyle v. Kyle, 52 N. J. Eq. 710.

In Johnson v. Johnson, 56 Atl. 708, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, holding that it is a justifiable separation
and not an obstinate desertion for married perDesertion:
Computation sons to live separately during the pendency of
a suit between them for a divorce, if the suit
of Time
is prosecuted in good faith, decides that in ascertaining and
computing the term of two years of defendant's desertion in
a petition for divorce, no part of the time during which a
previous suit for divorce was pending between the same
parties can be estimated as part of the period of desertion,
because during that time the separation is not obstinate. See
Weigel v. Weigel, 63 N. J. Eq. 677.
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EQUITY.

The Supreme Court of Ohio in Kirner v. Lake Shore &
M. S. Ry. Co., 69 N. E. 614, holds that the maxim, "He
,cletn
who comes into equity must come with clean
ands"
hands," requires only that the plaintiff must not
be guilty of reprehensible conduct with respect to the subject
matter of his suit, and decides that a railroad company,
having sold tickets with return coupons to a large number
of persons who desired to attend a convention, the tickets, by
their terms, being nontransferable, and the purchasers being
required, on returning, to show their identity as the original
purchasers, the contract resting upon a substantial reduction
in the price of carriage, is entitled to an injunction against
persons acquiring the return portions of such ticket from
the original purchasers and selling them to others to be used
by them in violation of the terms of such contract, and the
maxim referred to will not justify a denial of that relief
because the plaintiff had agreed with other carriers with
respect to the reduction of rates and the condition of tickets
for such occasion.
FINDING.

The Supreme Court of Oregon decides in Danielson v.
Roberts, 74 Pacific, 913, that plaintiffs, who, while working
Right to
for defendants, unearthed money on defendant's
Possession
premises, which the evidence tended to show had
been buried for some considerable time by the owner, who
was probably dead or unknown, were entitled to possession
of the money as against defendants, and could maintain
trover therefor.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds In re Fennell's Estate, 56 Atl. 875, that under the Act of June 8, 1893,
Postnuptial P. L. 344, giving to married women a right
to
Contracts
make any necessary contracts for the enjoyment
of the powers given them to acquire and possess real estate,
a postnuptial agreement entered into by a wife with her
husband, by which she releases her inchoate right of dower
for an adequate consideration, is binding upon her, though
there is no intention to suspend the marital relation.
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In Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Driscoll, 69 N. E. 62o, the
Supreme Court of Illinois holds that in an action by'a wife
to recover for the wrongful killing of her husDamages
for Death of band the re-marriage of the wife cannot be conHusband
sidered in mitigation of damages. See Philpott
v. Penna.R. R. Co., 175 Pa. 570.

INJUNCTIONS.

In Simpson v. Moorhead, 56 Atl. 887, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that where lands subject to ebb
and flow of tides are usable only for shooting
Trespass
of ducks and other game, intrusions day by day
upon such lands for the purpose of shooting will be enjoined.
The injury suffered by the owner, in the lessening the quantity of game, increasing the danger of accidental shooting,
and interfering with his exclusive shooting rights, is not
adequately remediable in damages.
In Packardv. Thiel College, 56 Atl. 869, it appeared that
certain citizens of a borough, thirty years after the location
Renovai .f of a college there, sued to restrain its removal
to another town, on the ground that they, with
College

certain other citizens, had subscribed a fund
with which land was bought and given to the trustees of the
college, for building purposes, after which the trustees permanently located the college in the borough. Under these
facts the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides that an
injunction to restrain the removal would be continued until
final hearing.
Buildings

INSANITY.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in Irvine v.
Gibson, 77 S.W. 1io6, that total mental derangement, or
Defence to an insane delusion on the subject to which slanAction for derous words relate, is a complete defence to an
Slander
action therefor. The case contains an interesting discussion of the liability of lunatics for torts. See
Bryant v. Jackson, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 199.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT.

In Franklin v. Tracy, 77 S. W. 1113, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides that a landlord is not liable to a
tenant for injury to his property from a colDefective
Premises
lapse of the building owing to inherent defects
in the construction of the building at the time it was rented,
of which the landlord did not have notice, but which he
might have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence
and which the tenant did not know and could not have discovered by ordinary diligence. See Doyle v. Union Pacific
Railway Co., 147 U. S. 413.

LIMITATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Michigan decides in Bates v.
Boyce's Estate, 98 N. W. 259, that where the majority
Corporations: stockholder in a corporation sells all the comStockholder's pany's property to himself, paying the other
stockholders nothing, an action by the adminisAction
tratrix of a defrauded stockholder for the conversion of
his interest is an action on behalf of the company, and for
the benefit of all stockholders, and hence is barred by limitations in the same manner as if brought by the company itself,
so that the administratrix's failure to discover for a time
that her intestate had an interest in the corporation would
not affect the case. See Wallace v. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island decides in Collins
v. Harrison, 56 Atl. 678, that the failure of an employer
to furnish a domestic servant with a lodging in
Domestic
Servant
such repair as not to endanger her health is a
violation of his legal duty to furnish safe appliances. It is
further held that such servant's right of action for sickness
fesulting from the leaking of the roof on her bedding is
not destroyed by her failure to leave the employment for
seven days after discovering the condition of the room,
where her employer had promised that if she would remain
he would repair the roof and provide suitable bedding. See
Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513.
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PARTNERSHIP.

The Supreme Court of California holds in Willey v.
Crocker-Woolworth Nat. Bank of San Francisco, 75 Pac.
Use of Phrase io6, that there being no law preventing the use
,.llae
of a trade-name by an individual, the use by
him of the term "& Co." after his name does
not import the existence of a partnership, or that any other
person than the individual named is interested in the business.

PHYSICIANS.

Interesting questions are constantly arising in connection
with the right of persons who claim to be able to cure disLicense:
ease to practise without a license from the state.
Osteopathy

A recent decision bearing upon osteopathy, is

found in State v. Herring, 56 Atl. 670, where the Supreme Court of New Jersey holds that an osteopathic physician, whose treatment of his patient consists simply of
the manipulation of the body, does not violate a statute which
forbids the applying of "any drug, medicine or other agency
or application" by a non-licensed person. Compare with
this case State v. Liffring, 6i Ohio St. 39, and the very
recent decision of State v. Biggs, 46 S. E. (N. C.) 4oi.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Day v. Exchange Bank of Kentucky, 78 S. W. 132, that while knowlImputed
edge acquired by an agent in purchasing bank
Knowledge stock from a bank, of the institution's impaired
condition will be imputed to his principal so as to start limitations against an action for false representations inducing
the purchase, similar knowledge acquired some years later,
where the same person became agent to effect the stock's
sale to third persons, will not be so imputed, the transactions
being separate and distinct. See Bramblett v. Henderson,
41 S. W. 575.
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RAILROADS.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds in West
Jersey & S. R. Co. v. Atlantic City, &c., Co., 56 Ad. 890,
Equity:
that jurisdiction to determine how conflicting
Jurisdiction easements of way across the same place shall be
occupied and used by two or more holders of such easements
is vested in the Court of Chancery. It is further decided
that where a newly organized company is authorized to lay
its railroad tracks at grade across the existing tracks of
another railroad, and the construction proposed involves only
such a crossing, the new company should pay the expenses
incident to the safe construction of its tracks across those of
the senior company. See for a case where the dispute was
between two railroad companies concerning the use of the
same tunnel, Del., Lack. & Western R. Co. v. Erie R. Co.,
21 N. J. Eq. 304.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey decides in McClosky
v. Atlantic City R. Co., 56 Atl. 669, that if a railroad comM.intenace pany has the right to maintain its railroad longiIn Public
tudinally upon a public street, and there is no
Street
law controlling the grade at which its tracks
shall be laid, it cannot be held responsible for damage done
by surface diverted from its roadbed, merely because its
track is higher than the established grade of the street "The
grade fixed by the city for the curb and side-walk bore no
legal relation to the grade of the track, in the absence of any
legal regulation enjoining conformity between them." See
in connection with this case Bowlsby v. Speer, 3 N. J.
Law, 351.
REASONABLE DOUBT.

The frequent attempts to have a court make a construction of a reasonable doubt favorable to the defendant are
What
constantly appearing. Thus in Cook v. State,
Constitues
35 Southern, 665, the following instruction was
asked, that: "Before the jury can convict the defendant the
evidence must be so strong as to convince each juror of his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and if, after considering
all the evidence, a single juror has a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt, arising out of any part of the evidence,
then the jury cannot convict him." This instruction was
refused and the Supreme Court of Florida holds properly so.
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RECEIVERSHIPS.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey decides in Nessler
v. Industrial Land Development Co., 56 Atl. 711, that an
order of the court to that effect, and also one for
Salary of
Preer"

authority to incur indebtedness, are necessary to

entitle receivers to retain their salary or compensation as a preferred claim as against claimants who have,.
at the request of the receiver, advanced money or performed
services for the trust; and, where the fund in hand is not
sufficient to pay all the receivers' debts and their compensation, the distribution must be made pro rata.
Claims

RECORDS.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana decides in Agurs v.
Belcher & Creswell, 35 Southern 6o7, that where a man
was unable to write his name and merely made
Notice
his mark, and where the notary erred as to the
vendor's name and wrote it "Willie Jones" instead of
"Willie Johnson" and the error was carried into the index
to the conveyance records, it cannot have the effect of depriving the vendee of his property, since the index was no
part of the record, but merely for the convenience of those
examining the record.
STREET RAILROADS.

The Supreme Court of Indiana decides in Indiana Ry.
Co. v. Hoff-man, 69 N. E. 399, that a street railroad
a contract to
Contract with operating its lines in a city under
issue transfer tickets free of charge to all passenmunicipal
Corporations: gers requesting the same, who might board its
Construction car at any point on any of its lines in the city,
and whose destination might be to any other point on any
other line of the company's road in the limits of the city, is
bound to transport a passenger tendering such transfer to
his destination on the company's line, though that be in
territory annexed to the city after the contract was made,
and on its interurban line, on which it had a franchise entitling it to charge an additional fare outside the city as its
limits were before the annexation of territory.
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TELEGRAPHS.

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Anderson, 78 S. W.
34, it is decided by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
that a telegraph company in Texas is liable for
Mental
Anguish:
damages for mental suffering resulting from
Conflict of
its negligence in failing to deliver promptly a
Laws
message sent from there to a non-resident plaintiff, although the jurisdiction in which the latter resides does
not authorize recovery in such cases. The Texas rule allowing damages for mental anguish in such cases is well known.

TELEPHONES.

In Meyer v. Standard Telephone Co., 98 N. W. 300, it
is decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa that the measure
of damages for unreasonable cutting of trees for
Cutting
trees:
the erection of a telephone is the difference beDamages
tween the value of the land as it would have
been if the cutting had been reasonable and what it was after
the cutting, not the difference between the value before and
after the cutting.
TRESPASSERS.

In Sigur v. Burguieres, 35 Southern, 823, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana decides that one who occupies no better
Improveposition than that of trespasser may yet claim
ments
reimbursement of the cost of clearing land
whereby such land is brought into cultivation, and when to
cultivate it is its chief value. And it is further held that
he may also claim for such ameliorations as have added to
the permanent value of the land.
WILLS.

In Burroughs v. Cutter, 56 Atl. 649, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, decides that when an executor is given
power in the will to apply the property of the
Powerof
Sale:
testator to the support and education of a minor
Constructlon child, and is authorized to sell and convey prop-

erty for that purpose, and dies without having done so, the
power and authority do not pass to the minor, nor to his
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guardian, unless expressly so stated in the will.
with this case Clifford v. Stewart, 95 Me. 41.

Compare

A testator devised to his wife for her natural life "all of
my property and estate, real, personal and mixed, whenever
the term
Construction: found and however situated, during
Life

Est.,e

aforesaid, my said wife to use and expend what

may be necessary for her maintenance and support during said term." The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, construing this clause in Barker v. Clark, 56 Atl. 747,
holds that the will gave the wife not only a life estate, but
also empowered her to dispose of the same for her maintenance when necessary. See Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N.
H. 267.

There is no presumption of revocation of a will by mutilation where the will was not shown to have been in testator's
possession, or to have been found among his
Mutilation: papers after his decease in the condition in
which it was offered for probate: Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Stevens v. StevenS, 56 Atl. 916.
In re Redhead's Estate, 35 Southern 761, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi holds that an instrument beginning,
Vay_

"Realizing the uncertainty of life at all times,
and the dangers incident to travel, I leave this

as a memoranda of my wishes should anything happen to
me during my proposed trip," is a valid will, though the
testator did not die till after his return from the trip
referred to.

WITNESS.

The general rule preventing testimony by an interested
party as to transactions with decedents makes the decision
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania In re
Tranacnty:

with

Decedent

Allen's Estate, 56 Atl. 928, of more than local
interest. It is there held that where a father
transferred property to his son as an advance-

ment or gift, on the father's death, under act of May 23,
1887, sec. 4, P. L. 159, providing that no interest, merely,
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WITNESS (Continued).

shall make a person incompetent as a witness, and declaring
that if any party to a contract or a thing in action is dead,

and his right thereto has passed, a surviving party to such
contract shall not be a competent witness, unless the contest
be between the parties respectively claiming such property
by devolution on the death of such owner, the son is not
competent to testify as to matters occurring in his father's
lifetime in connection with the advancement.

